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Bulletin de l'APAD
Boundaries, cohesion and switching.
On we‑groups in ethnic, national
and religious forms
Georg Elwert
1 Research on nationalism, ethnicity and fundamentalism has become ‑ it seems ‑ an easy
task. There are authors we all cite, and there are the objects of our study, which delineate
themselves quite clearly. This selfdelineation poses however, as this paper shall argue,
problems for social science, because it induces us to overlook 1. processes of switching
between different frames of reference, 2. processes of (physical) reproduction (namely
the link to families), which does not go without saying, 3. the fuzziness of the limits,
which may fulfil specific social functions. The first issue ‑ the process of switching ‑ is
rarely used as a reference point in the study of we‑groups, since the actors themselves
rather  insist  on  stability  of  their  group.  It  seems  to  me  however  that  this  odd
phenomenon can bring us new insights. We may use it as a plough to work through the
garden of ethnicity theory.
2 Some of authors in the field, namely those representing the essentialist tendency, have
become victims of the discourse of the groups studied, insofar as they believe in the
primordiality of emotions and traditions as the basis for the creation and maintenance of
we‑groups.
3 So‑called  ethnic  violence  in  Bosnia,  Somalia  and  Turkey  is  explained  this  way.  This
sounds plausible to us, because the suffering of the victims is expressed in emotions and
creates strong emotions in us. But this is only a link of connotations, not a logical one.
Violence of the type reported from these countries, social (=organized) violence, with
weapons, transport of actors to the field, the premeditation of ambushes etc. requires
logistics and presence of mind, not spontaneous emotions (or the vagueness of historical
references  to  traditions).  There  are  central  actors  like  warlords  or  politic  al
entrepreneurs  to  be  studied,  and  we  must  look  at  the  role  of  conflict‑chanelling
institutions, of economic solidarity and of communication in order to understand the
stabilization of we‑groups. Switching becomes an important focus in this field of study
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not  only  because  understanding  cases  of  failed  stabilization  helps  us  to  better
comprehend conditions of stability, but also because it openly contradicts assumptions
about "deep‑rooted traditions" which might condition a given we‑group.
4 First,  we  shall  try  to  understand  what  might  be  the  usefulness  of  referring  to  the
complicated concept of "we‑groups" instead of limiting ourselves to nationalism or to
fundamentalism.
Processes under the appearance of stable entitiesWe‑groups
5 It is a common assumption that ethnicity is a case for anthropologists and nationalism
one for political scientists. That's wrong ! Both phenomena can be classified as we‑group
processes.  They  share  with  other  we‑group  processes,  namely  class  movements  and
religious movements, the same driving forces and systemic patterns. Thus, there are no
separate  tools  for  their  analysis,  be  it  the  hermeneutics  of  fieldwork  or  distanced
systemic analysis.
6 Examples for motives underlying nationalism and other we‑group processes :
• Mega‑identities : migrants losing their frame of reference which provided prestige for them,
are attracted by mega‑identities, which compensate for the lost individual one, like
Pan‑Germany (GroBdeutschland), world revolution etc.
• Clientelism : in competition over new resources it may be of advantage to create a
c1ientelist network designed as a "we‑group".
• Moral ethnicity : if behaviour seen as antisocial is felt as a personal threat, one option is to
create a social form imagined as a community but framed as an organisation which excludes
the immoral ones and unites the moral ones 1.
Social construction
7 Two elements underlie, as basic assumptions, the argumentation :
• Neither ethnic groups nor nations constitute a "natural" order. They compete in human
history with other types of social organisation for the place of the central organizing
structure. We can even find social structures where there are no we‑groups of the ethnic
type (Elwert 1989). 
• Nations and ethnic groups are social structures which have to be reproduced. That means,
they have to be recreated by each successive generation. They may have to fulfil new
functions and may use old plausibilities. But the transmission of plausibilities works only if
the functions are satisfied.
Switching between we‑group identities
8 One remarkable feature of we‑groups is the process we call switching. That means a rapid
change from one frame of  reference to  the other.  A class  movement  may become a
nationalist one, a nationalist movement transforms itself into a religious mobilization, or
a  religious  network  redefines  itself  as  a  class  movement.  Switching  processes  easily
escape scientific treatment because they "change the department" ‑  from religious to
social, to political studies and vice versa.
9 Examples :
10 Sri  Lanka's  Trotskytes turned their  class  movement into an ultra‑nationalist  militant
organisation. 
11 Iraq's secularist, nationalist Baath party redefined itself under Sadam Hussein as Islamic ‑
and won international support.
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12 Hamas  is  about  to  gain  political  supremacy  by  restating  the  (previously  secular
nationalist) Palestinian cause as an Islamic one.
13 Patrilineal descent groups in the tension field of Afghanistan reacted with identification
or by stating difference with the religiously defined powers and thus turned into religious
sects (Canfield).
14 We (Kristina Kehl & Georg Elwert) studied Alevites in Turkey 2. The first thing we know
with some historical certainly, is that there were endogamous groups who wanted to
differentiate themselves from the Sunnite Ottoman rule. The Shiite façade and the rule of
secrecy covered in fact a wide range of beliefs. Under Atatürk's Republic they became
fervent  republicans,  were  over‑represented  in  the  left  of  center  republican  and  in
socialist  organizations.  The installation of the holy men ("dedeler")  who kept the oral
traditions was discontinued. The holy books ("buyruk") were given away. But since the
Alevites' identity was ascribed to them also from the outside and was maintained by their
social environment, they were forced to continue endogamy.
15 Now, the new conjuncture of religious prestige symbols and boundary definitions, the self
declared moral rearmament of fundamentalism, induces them to re‑create a religious
"identity". They are very active in retrieving ‑ with the help of foreign anthropologists ‑
old  religious  folklore,  copying  religious  books ;  they  confront  the  painful  task  of
harmonizing the incompatible and some move forward directly to sheer invention of
"forgotten"  beliefs  (with  some  Iranian  help).  None  of  these  transformations  could
alleviate violence against this group.
16 The  readiness  to  strike  ‑  wrongly  called  "hatred"  ‑  is  conditioned  by  the  internal
dynamism of  the dominant "community",  which,  in order to regain its  self‑image of
community,  longs  for  the  symbolic  affirmation  of  difference.  Because  of  the
heterogeneity of the dominant ones the easiest option for the definition of the "we" is the
creation of foes represented as a negative print of the morality, which one would like to
have as a self‑description. The Alevites are easy targets for this, just because they happen
to be there, not because of this or that feature 3.
17 The concept of switching refers a) to alternations between reference frames and b) to
moves between different more‑or‑less inclusive conceptions of the group's boundary. The
switching may imply a redefinition of the group's boundaries, or these boundaries may be
kept and reinterpreted.
18 Redefinition of boundaries : A strategically important minority may be included or an
"annoying"  group  of  actors  excluded  (Thus  Nazi  Germany  forged  a  concept  of
"Volksdeutsche"/ethnic  Germans,  which  included  the  Austrian  origin
"Sudeten‑Deutsche" and the Dutch origin Mennonites of Russia and Ukrania and excluded
the Jewish population of East Europe, which had been the main organizer of German
schools and other cultural organizations in these countries and whose German ethnicity
was hailed and instrumentalized by the German army's high command (Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht) in the First World War). A segment of a larger group may discover their
"real" identity or several groups may "re"‑unite under one umbrella.
19 Redefinition of boundaries kept : In the case that the boundaries .are kept, the change of
reference  level  brings  other  actors  or  resources  into  play  or  pushes  them  to  the
background  where  they  risk  being  forgotten.  Sensible  (or  shrewd)  political  actors
preempt changes, takins the lead.
20 Another example :
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21 Among the groups marginalized by dominating Christian and Islamic groups in the Horn
of  Africa emerged a  label  "Galla"  or "Oromo"  which was linked to a  specific  mode of
cohesion 4. A generation and age class system allowed for the integration of neighbours.
The expansion of the very militant Oromo groups along with and against the Ethiopian
empire was a constant undercurrant of history at the Horn of Africa ‑ till they became, in
the 20th century, the most extended ethnic label of Abessinia. Modern civil war put them
under a different stress. Though one can still observe "Oromization" (Thomas Zitelmann)
in refugee camps, in other situations the "identity" (belongingness) is redefined by using
some (patrilineal)  kinship  links,  (Kushitic)  multilinguality,  Islam or  Christian  tainted
laicism as a reference in order to become part of a Tigre kindred, a Somali clan, spearhead
of an Islamic movement or Ethiopian nationalist.
22 The dynamics of maintaining or reshaping boundaries, of defining values and institutions
as central or as marginal, is the product of tensions within the socio‑political context.
This  is  valid  whether  the  "identity"  sought  is  the  ideologized  sentiment  of  value
ascription or  the  definable  characteristics  of  real  or  invented cultural  traits.  Similar
contexts  of  tension  will  reproduce  similar  configurations  of  we‑groups  (see  also
Wimmer). When the crucial political categories are religious, the marginal populations
tend to become "heretics" (cf. Canfield). When the crucial political categories are national
or  ethnic,  those  marginal  populations  which  can  only  escape  the  dynamics  of
peripherization by marking their difference, show ethnical distinction.
23 In order to create difference or to reach incorporation switching may be necessary. This
follows a pattern which might be called the "clarity imperative" :  there is a need for
both : an accepted code and clear markers.
24 The code may be religion, ethnicity, local group, kinship. The code may even narrow
down to a sub‑code or may widen. So "religion" may be narrowed down to book religion,
or book religion to Islam. So the Pashtoo nomads who till the last century were Jews then
had to mark their difference within the Islamic code, when only this became acceptable 5.
Inversely the Christian Bogumil heresy in the Balkans increased the clarity of difference
in reference to their Serb and Croat neighbours by switching to Islam, when conquered by
the Ottomans ‑ which created the Bosnians. The codes of "locality" and "kinship", which
now are presented as remnants from a past when human beings lived in accordance with
nature, are not natural at all. Like age, generation, gender and physical features, locality
and kinship are ways to give social order a natural appearance, "to naturalize" it 6. But
there is no natural law that made any of these references a strictly observed organizing
principle to be found in every human group. "Kinship" may be an idiom expressing also
ties of neighbourship, "age" may actually mean generation etc : The code of locality in the
definition of we‑groups may be a means of defining land rights ‑ among the Mapuche in
Chile as among the Gur speaking groups of northern Ghana, Togo and Bénin "people of
the  earth"  or  "people  from  here"  are  common  self‑given  names.  In  other  social
environments  marriage  rights  and  inheritance  are  the  crucial  issues ;  there  kinship
(especia1ly unilateral kinship) is the reference code to define the dominant we‑group
structure (not excluding locality etc. as a secondary reference, to which one may switch).
25 Changes of shape or parameters of reference can occur within we‑groups with amazing
rapidity (which is conditioned by the volatility of power) (Wallerstein).  This does not
exclude the continuity of "ethnic" names, which is instrumental to any claims of political
inheritance rights.
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26 Ethnic names, a specific type of music (see During on Uzbekistan), traditional norms and
so forth constitute the inventory upon which a given group may draw in order to design
its limits and its "identity". This inventory may be limited or it may be broad. It will be
broad in situations of enhanced interregional communication. This inventory should be
distinguished from a closet where one hangs a selection of one's coats, because these
symbols are not owned. Some salient marker of distinction seen somewhere else may well
be adopted,  as  a  sign familiar  from childhood on.  Inventories  are shared with other
collective actors. Thus symbol use may overlap or may even alternate between enemy
groups.  The  acquisition of  symbols  is,  however,  not  random.  It  is conditioned by  a)
plausibility respect with of other markers of order and b) by the communicative need to
create salience and difference. An example of the first is the importance of all references
which suggest collective rights of past generations in an environment where inheritance
is a strong argument for claims.  Examples of  the second need are too obvious to be
detailed here (national dress, orthographic reforms, racial ideologies etc.)
27 Toughts on the recurrence of essentialism :
28 The phenomenon of switching is uncomfortable for any essentialist theory. Because those
"primordial values", which presumably constitute by their very "nature" the boundaries
of ethnic groups, suddenly lose relevance. At this point a discussion of the recurrence of
essentialism might  be  appropriate.  Has  been Max Weber's  time  it  shown that  those
groups which call themselves "ethnic" or "national" use boundaries in respect to criteria
of functionality of the social structure they aimed at, on the one hand, and criteria of
plausibility, which "goes without saying" in their respective context, on the other hand. It
is  society  dressed  as  community,  which  produces  the  emotional  cohesion  of  these
we‑groups.
29 Those who argued against Weber (or later against R. Thumwald, W. Mühlmann, F. Barth
etc., who took up his ideas) that there were "natural" forces binding all ethnic groups
together ‑ namely language, religion, culture ‑ could be confronted by empirical examples
of ethnic groups, recognised as such by all their neighbours, which lacked at least one of
these criteria (see the latest  demonstration by Thomas Höllmann on Southeast Asian
examples,  and for the history of ideas Ernst W. Müller).  The reason why, spite of all
evidences for the formalist perspective, some authors come back to an essentialist view
(or try to "harmonize" these logically incompatible concepts), may be due to the fact that
we all are working in the environment of common popular ideas. Most ethnic groups try
to present themselves as "natural" ; this induces a continuous stream of "immigration of
protoscientific ideas" into social science.
Multiple optionsPolytaxis ‑ the latent multiplicity of order and identity
30 Groups  and  individuals  may  belong  to  different  reference  groups  simultaneously ;
according to the opportunity they may stress one or an other of these affiliations as their
"real" one (see Geertz, Goody, Schlee, Zitelmann).
31 The  switching  process  uses  a  characteristic  of  human  society,  which  animal  social
structures, so popular in theories of in‑group behavior, do not share :  the capacity to
preserve,  in  latency,  different  orders.  We are  all  multilingual,  at  least  in  respect  to
language registers, we master different roles which we put into practice according the
situation and we make consecutive use of several affiliations (several modes of belonging,
or identities in the strict systemic sense).  We may call  this phenomenon polytaxis or
polytactic potential (from the greek polus many and taxis order).
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32 Thought on the concept of identity :
33 At this point we need to discuss the concept of identity. Currently there is a boom in
essays on this concept. And it's not an accident that it is almost never operationalized.
34 Most  commonly  identity  means,  the  guise  of  a  scientific  concept,  an  ideologized
sentiment. A closer look, however, reveals three different meanings which are sometimes
brought together :
• Belongingness (membership. The binding together of different people, this stems from the
old philosophical meaning ; I refer to identity in this sense, if not mentioned otherwise.).
There is logically no problem to be part of several categories.
• Self information (what do people think that characterizes themselves).
• Self‑valuation / attribution of prestige (what are parameters of esteem and where does one
place one's own group in relation to others ; a central field of research ‑ as the foregoing one
‑ which should not be confused with identity in the strict sense which should however be
seen in correlation to it).
Individual / situational switching
35 There is, however, a difference between the function of polytactic identities within closed
and within open structures (in most cases identical with the opposition of ethnic groups
and nations). For African ethnic structures it is the commonly case that individuals can
claim several affiliations. There we find situational switching (or : ethnic conversion) as
an individual process. It is quite rare that there is only one "ethnic identity". (In a famine
a Fulani herder in the West African Borgu might opt for the sedentary way of life of a
Gando, if he were poor, or might become a Dendi trader, if he had some wealth).
36 This remarkable freedom of option, we can observe should however not induce us to
anthropological  romantism.  The  multiple  opportunities  of polytaxis  alson  create
involuntary situational switching. A person may be excluded. e. g., if it is "discovered" by
oracle that he or she belongs "in reality" not to our we‑group, but to the secret order of
witches.
37 There  are  some  configurations  where  individual  switching  is  a  common  answer  to
conjunctural ups and downs (Horn of Africa, the interior delta of the Niger) there are
many others where this is uncommon and may be ultimately achieved only at burial after
living as the "foreign" married wife or husband for a long period in the new community.
The difference between these configurations seems to me to be created by the different
(especially  more  or  less  elaborated)  structure  of  the  boundary  zone  and its  "impact
procedures", the liminality of social systems (see below).
38 Once open (ethnic) groups are transforri1ed into "para‑national" bodies with established
rights with respect to the state, there starts a painful process of opting between these ‑
quite  convenient  ‑  multipul  options  and  to  negate  ail  but  one  of  them  by
pseudo‑historical  text  production.  With  nationalities  it  is  rather  the  exception  (and
tolerated only for a transition) that there are multiple affiliations. Within the nation‑state
ethnic options are rigidly welded on to the state structure and its formal procedures.
Nationality and subnational entities with only singular options of belonging are such a
case. Some countries even insist in a symbolically very prominent way on this singular
subnationality by printing it on identity cards (in Rwanda these were instrumental for the
organized genocide of Tutsis).
39 This rigid coupling constitutes a major difference between identities in an ethnic or an
national field of reference. Individual switching in the national field tends to become a
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form  of  "cheating".  Potential  multiple  belongings  (identities)  become  something
dangerous, if agitators label them as potentially disloyal. Ethnic cleansing is then some
nation states' final answer to polytaxis.
Political entrepreneurs / central persons as catalysts of collective switching
40 I said above that switching is a rather common, although rarely noticed process (leaders
prefer  continuity  and  "historical  roots"  and  anthropologists  are  the  natural  prey  of
ideological leaders). This does not imply that there is any theory for collective switching.
Individual situational switching (opportunistic switching in the descriptive sense) is one
thing, but collective ; coordinated : and synchronized switching is an other. Motives have
to be redefined, new labels become the markers for connection, old labels have to be
declared invalid, boundaries have to be redefined. Therefore a minimal consensus has to
be sought.
41 However the social  structure provides in general no routines or institutions for such
negotiation  processes.  This  requires  a  very  specific  type  of  social  actor :  political
entrepreneurs or central persons. 
42 My hypothesis is that switching processes are correlated with a process whereby the
number  of  subjectively  active  actors  in  a  given  field  (politics)  is  increased,  whereas
paradoxically  in  the  same  process  the  number  of  actors  providing  interpretation  ‑
especially of new phenomena ‑ and implied in structurally relevant decisions declines.
The  subjective  impression  is  that  "we  are  all  getting  politicized"  ‑  more  people  are
entering the political arena.
43 But  after  an  initial  ("chaotic")  phase,  the  number  of  those  who  indicate  (virtual)
directions,  leaders  in  the strict  sense,  decreases.  If,  subjectively,  the  chaos  of  future
becomes a problem, if the "creation of a future", the selection of paths for future events
became the desideratum, then the moment for a specific type of actor has come : These
are people who can produce a restriction of  future options under the appearance of
opening ways in a thicket. In other words, they can create power "from nothing" ; it is a
power which emerges from beyond the established decision‑making procedures. The ones
who can produce this "miracle" we will refer to as central persons. They are big men,
warlords or adopted leaders (from the outside).
44 Big men and warlords both can convert prestige into power (= big men) or wealth into
power (= warlords). They act in the resource triangle of power, wealth and prestige.
45 Warlords turn the wheel  clockwise.  They create power with money for weapons and
mercenaries, win prestige from power, which gives them credit for the acquisition of new
wealth. Big men turn it the other way round. They transform prestige into power. Power
may create wealth, but wealth and labour power has to be "devoted" to the people in
order to create prestige.
46 Power can also have its origin outside of the we‑group. We shall call these central persons
"adopted leaders". Kemal Atatürk of the Alevi‑community seems, to me, to be an example
of  this  case.  Another more recent example is  the role chancellor Kohl  played in the
East‑German transformation process  (after  the Protestant big men of  the civil  rights
movement reached the limits of their mobilization capacity).
47 But the formal mechanism of importing power from the outside or of creating power
from prestige or wealth is not sufficient. Central persons need, for their success, a very
specific personal quality : an interpretation capacity (Deutungsmacht) which links them
in a  feed‑back loop to  the  polytactic  reference  schemes of  those  they want  to  lead.
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Interpretation and orientation relieve one of the strain of complexity. The capacity to
produce interpretation with seeming clarity, to reduce the complexity of the future with
intellectual tools is the personal attribute which is required.
48 Political entrepreneurs may also switch individually from separatism to nationalism or
vice  verso.  (Thus  the  former  separatist  Konrad  Adenauer  became  later  a  symbol  of
moderate national feelings in Germany. Silvio Magnano left the Italian fascist student
movement  to  become a  successful  leader  of  the  (separatist)  South‑Tyrolians).  One  is
tempted  to  say  that  in  the  environment  of  nation  states  one  has  to  be  a  political
entrepreneur in order to switch, since individual switching there is usually prohibited.
Ideologies for switching
49 Switching is  not  a  random process.  It  is  not  even "normal".  For social  scientists  the
phenomenon of switching should of course be normal, but for the individual in most
situations  routine  and  continuity  is  the  easier  option.  Switching  has  to  refer,  as
formulated above,  to established symbolic  inventories  and is  limited by these ;  if  for
example religious we‑groups have no historic precedence and if they do not constitute
networks  of  communication  or  exchange  nor  provide  institutions  for  conflict
arbitrations,  then  there  is  no  switching  possible  in  the  direction  of  this  religious
reference.
50 Central persons may have to add to the inventory and they must alter the structure of
relevances  7 (new  goals  have  to  become  more  important  than  those  stabilizing  the
routine) before they can activate switching. To alter the structure of relevance new fears
and new hopes have to be instilled.
51 Changes in the .field of symbols which concretise and order perception have a peculiar
algorithm. They should be close to the accustomed ways of thinking and yet at the same
time appear to be innovations. 99% accustomed concepts + 99% innovations would be an
appropriate formula.  The best solution is  travesty !  The innovations are presented as
traditions (see Papstein and Hobsbawm & Ranger on the invention of tradition) and/or
conceptual limits are retained and only their appearance is altered 8.
52 If deeper changes in the social structure are sought or if marginal persons want to occupy
center  stage,  then  another  algorithm  might  be  more  appropriate  or  be  used
concurrently : the creation of a co‑ordinate system. Something is defined as a core norm
and every behaviour is judged in terms of distance this zero point. Belonging to a specific
"race", belief in some value or practice of some rituals are defined as "the fundamentals"
from which any other condition of well‑being can be deduced. It seems not convincing to
me to accept the self made definition of the protagonists that the "fundamentals" were
the doctrinal core of their religion. Whether the 'shador' or trinitarianism, these beliefs
are seldom those found in the holy books.  Symbols are chosen which react  to other
symbols in the time of present action.
53 Even a non‑doctrinal religion such as Hinduism is attributed some "fundamentals" (see
Randeria).  The  leaders  define  their  own  place  as  "zero".  That  is  the  irony  of
fundamentalism. 
Driving people into otherness
54 It should not be forgotten that besides ideologies used for active switching, people may
also be driven into an other self definition. Most of the Jews expatriated by Nazi‑Germany
gave up the self definition "German" and kept the new American, Israeli etc. identity'
even after the war, when they could opt back.
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55 A paradigmatic case is that of the Alsatians (and Lothringians 9), the inhabitants of the
former German province ElsaB‑Lothringen,  1872 ‑  1918,  on the left  bank of the river
Rhine (following Jahr 1995).  In 1914, when the First World War started, they were as
engaged for the nationalist case as any other German "tribe" ("Stamm"). But since their
"Germanness" dated only from 1872 (when Germany annexed this part of France without
asking its inhabitants, based only upon the linguistic fact that they ‑spoke German) the
military hierarchy was mistrustful. Thus they treated this territory, once the war started,
as occupied land. When German troops accidentally fired on each other, it was suspected,
that these were shots from a guerilla,  though there were never any.  Censorship was
imposed upon newspapers and letters.  If  an Alsatian soldier did not return from the
battlefield, it was immediately suspected that he was a deserter, though with others it
was assumed that they were killed or taken prisoner. In spite of no statistical support for
this prejudice, the Alsatian recrutes got a special treatment. Civilians who called each
other names by making reference to the others' home region faced imprisonment, if the
verbal  aggressor  was  Alsatian and the  other  not  –  but  not  vice  verso 10.  People  felt
deserted  by  Germany.  Without  any  underground  pro‑French  movement  the  opinion
changed completely till  1918.  When the French entered the territory after the peace
agreement,  they  were  hailed  and  everyone  declared  her‑  or  himself  to  be  French,
although the majority of the population had given up bilingualism during the German
period and for most people "French" was only their parents or grandparents identity. The
same procedure seems to be used by the Turkish army "in order to" drive any Turkish
identity out of the Kurdish‑speaking populations of its East.  The Russian government
probably "succeeded" this year driving out any remnant of Russian identity among the
population of its province Chechnya.
56 Populations deprived of equal access to the social and material goods relevant to them
tend to opt for an other identity. The German proletariat of the 19th century who opted
for the internationalist we‑group of "The working class" is, to my mind, such a case. This
phenomenon is  strengthened,  if  these people get ascribed a different identity by the
majority -under this condition labelling and insult can become a material force. Some
movements of the American blacks seem to me to be such a case (cf.  Irek).  A higher
prestige  status  and  the  hope ;  for  a  better  material  status  associated  with  it  make
switching the best and easiest option.
ReproductionEthnicity / national identity and family structures
57 Switching  is  more  commonly  linked  to  daily  behaviour  than  our anthropological  or
political research mentions. The definition of belonging to some group is directly linked
to the field of kinship and alliance structures.  It depends upon the kinship structure
taken into account whether a  person belongs to her/his  father's,  mother's,  mother's
brother's or spouse's ethnic group. Once ethnic groups or nation get established, the
production of kinship laws is one of their first occupations.
58 This  brings  us  back  to  the  classic  definition  of  an  ethnic  group.  Frederik  Barth's
definition,  refering  to  ascription and selfascription of  boundaries,  is  too  broad.  This
remained unnoticed for some time, since every reader had some preconception of what
was meant. The definition implies also, if we read it strictly, political milieus and other
subcultures. What was implicit as a defining characteristic was that these groups are a
sub‑set of those groups which transcend families and which integrate families as the
central reproductive structures.
Definition
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59 Ethnic groups are family‑inclusive social  categories,  which ascribe themselves (or get
ascribed by others) an (exclusive or multiple) identity. 
60 To be born into a family identified with a given group produces the right to belong to this
group according to the membership definition attached to this family. Switching implies
the negotiation of identities, legal conflicts over the question to whom someone belongs
and the "underlife" ("cheating") present in all human behaviour towards norms. All this
is exposed in individual strategies dealing with ethnicity via kinship and alliance. People
may be included by an initiation ritual which is required for marriage. They may opt for
matrilineality  instead  of  patrilineality.  They  may,  in  a  virilocal  environment,  use
uxorilocality as a means of integration. Endogamy as a group norm is no accident. In fact,
it may be a strategically necessary element.
61 States  are  conscious  of  this.  It  is  remarkable  that  even  countries  which  claim  ‑  in
simplification ‑  that their citizenship is defined according locality ("ius soli") and not
according to descendance ("ius sanguinis") like France and the US, devote much attention
to the difference between marriage and "sham marriage" or to the marital status of their
citizens' children born abroad.
62 This  link  between  the  dynamics  of  we‑groups  and  reproduction  has  impacts  upon
demography, if we break down statistics to the level of groups differentiated by social
structure or culture. The mode of inclusion affects demographic growth or shrinking on
different levels.  That migration is  linked to individual  switching is  obvious.  Whether
migrants who marry in are counted as locals or not depends upon the specific mode of
inclusion. Neither the modes of inclusion nor the groups' limits are stable. The limits may
change within a generation.
63 In some groups (e.g. the Berba of northern Bénin) women have no ethnic status at all.
Their social integration is reached through sons, who undergo the initiation ritual. To
bear  children  is  a  primary  social  necessity  for  women  in  these  or  similar  social
conditions.
Finding formsStabilizing we‑group identities
64 Once we see switching as a normal process which reveals to us the universal polytactic
potential, then we can have a fresh look on those groups which do not switch or at least
keep their boundaries.
65 What stabilizes ethnic groups and other we‑groups ? Current theory is mostly concerned
with processes of splitting, of re‑drawing boundaries and in the creation (invention) of
legitimating ideology. Some hints may be found in the long listings of how nations are
built in modernization theory. (There however every conceivable factor is touched in
such a way that the theories can never be wrong.) 
66 It seems to me that two processes are central :
• moral economy/practical solidarity : a distribution process of goods and services which, by
man y actors, is not seen as (market‑ )economy. The principles of distribution are rather
those which economic anthropology calls generalized reciprocity or redistribution. This
extends from help for anonymous persons belonging to the same we‑group to redistribution
through welfare and pension schemes (see Elwert 1987, Kohli 1987).
• institutions of conflict resolution : the increase of the conflict processing capacities
(Konfliktfähigkeit). This may be obtained by the creation of institutions for arbitration or by
the implementation of a normative system equally relevant for all the members of the
we‑group (see Albert Hirschman 1994). It was not "common values" but the new "B.G.B."
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(common law) which made, at the end of last century, national Germans out of the citizens
of the German States. It is often stated that common values ‑ at least a minimal core ‑are
needed to create a we‑group. Empirically we have difficulty finding cases to illustrate this
point ; what we find are institutions and mutually accepted procedures which forego the
creation of common values.
67 As a German I am supposed to bring language into the discussion (following Herder, who
"naturalized"  nations  by  reference  to  language  11).  There  are,  however,  sufficient
we‑groups of ethnic form without a common language, to contradict this idea. We should
rather draw attention to the fact that communities of discourse can also be interpreted or
seen  in  relation  to  arbitration  of  conflict  and  economics  of  reciprocity.  Arbitration
requires a code and this code has to have a linguistic form (a given language or two
corresponding isomorphic registers of two languages). Norms about sharing knowledge
or  keeping it  in  secrecy ‑  and so making it  an economic good ‑  constitute  codes  of
communication, which make a language a relevant or an irrelevant tool for social action.
68 Not one language directly,  but one network of communication combined with shared
social norms seem to be at the basis of all  processes of we‑group formation. Even in
situation of seeming powerlessness this combination allows for the attribution of honour
and shame (the "reputation sanction") as means of social control.
69 Those features of community which strike us most ‑ a common habitus (similarities in
style and routines) ‑ have been studied by Ralph Bohnsack and his group in their analysis
of group formation among German youth. It turned out that habitual community is a later
development.  It  starts  with  a  mutual  articulation  of  individual  plans  for  activities,
creating  an  interdependence,  which  one  may  call  community  of  fate
(Schicksalsgemeinschaft).  Norm‑breaking  or  violence  which  provokes  revenge  are
powerful  but risky means to create a community of  fate in the emphatic sense ;  the
weaker the groups' capacity to create a common code or habitus, the stronger is the
inclination to produce collective risk or foes by means of violence if necessary.
Liminality
70 Social systems do not only exist in the self‑limiting status of ethnic groups, although the
mode of information storage in anthropology (arranged according to ethnic groups) may
suggest this. There are two modes : one is characterized by opening up and networking
with the imperative to inc1ude an optimal number of persons,  who beforehand were
strangers to me, into my network of reciprocal relations.  The other is the restrictive
closing up of we‑group formation, which this paper dealt with. But it is both forms, the
bimodality of networking and group closure, which make for the dynamism of mankind.
Though we may conceive some historical processes as an alternation of both modes, I
want,  rather,  to  draw  attention  to  social  arrangements  which  combine  both  ‑  the
definition of people as strangers and their inclusion.
71 The self description of those features of we‑groups which make for their stability rarely
mentions the fact that all these arrangements seldom produce unambiguous borderlines.
Yet  the  multiplicity  of  social  subsystems  produces  rather  complicated  legal
arrangements : differentiation between political and economic citizenship, civic rights for
strangers as social or economic actors e.g. Each of these boundaries can be subject to a
tidal movement whereby some actors are for some time in or out. This causes the social
boundary ‑mostly unnoticed by the majority of population ‑ to become a broad "liminal
zone" 12. This liminal zone fulfills important social functions. Here is a field where new
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ideas and arrangements are tested out before they become adopted as "ours". This very
adoption as "ours", the "nostrification", requires for some items social arrangements,
institutions.
72 In order to find out what can pass and what needs to be scrutinized, this liminal zone acts
as  ship  locks.  Because  of  their  precarious  positions  persons  in  this  field  are  highly
sensitized. They may perceive earlier the usefulness of a new arrangement (because they
saw earlier its functioning outside the system or in the liminal zone) and they may react
more allergically to something as "strange" (because they want to be "in").
The "modernity" of nationalism
73 The strength of  the  human race  in  respect  to  other  animals  is  our  great  flexibility.
Multiple identities and switching processes contribute considerably to this. The creation
of nation states (which was an "evolutionary success”,  or,  to be more precise,  which
proved to be instrumental for pattern expansion in other fields) produced, however, a
set‑back with respect to flexibility for individuals' polytactic social behaviour.
74 Rather  complicated  legal  arrangements  try  to  make  up  for  with  this  draw‑back
(differentiation between political and economic citizenship, civic rights for strangers as
social or economic actors e. g.). They create social boundaries that become broadened
liminal zones serving as surrogates for polytactic ethnic flexibility.
75 From the perspective of an individual actor who makes opportunistic use of his multiple
affiliations  in  an  ethnically  defined  environment,  a  national  structure  still  looks
"underdeveloped".  It  is  still  a  long way till  we will  reach the flexibility of we‑group
identity, which is the strength of ethnic systems.
76 Nationalism  and  other  we‑group  mobilizations  are,  however,  a  product  of
"modernization"  in  a  restricted  sense  if  we  conceive  as  "formal  modernization"  the
concomitance of expanding market economies with expanding communications systems
linked by a positive feed‑back, then nationalism and fundamentalism are clearly aspects
of this. We should, however, keep in mind that this definition of modernization does not
imply  any  reference  to  (civic)  values  or  to  social  differentiation  through
institution‑building.
77 Warlord systems and genocides are part of modernization in this perspective. Insofar as
modernization  increasingly  creates  links  to  anomymous  people  and,  as  these  links
increasingly  dominate  the  life  world  as  "societal"  (gesellschaftliche)  relations,  there
emerge undercurrents which reinterprete and reconstruct social links as something built
upon emotions or face to face relations (c.f. Frühwald). If, for example, marriage is less an
affair to be regulated by lineages, and if selection of mating partners is opened to persons
unknown to the heads of families, while the formal guarantees and rituals are handled
more and more by state authorities,  then "love" becomes an attractive code for  the
interpretation of decisions leading to marriage (cf. Luhmann). I put this ex ample into the
foreground in order to underline the fact that nationalism is not the only "undercurrent".
But  it  is  a  rather  obvious  case.  Societal  links  are  reinterpreted  as  community  (Max
Weber). The real process may be one of building institutions which link persons, who are,
in most cases,  anonymous to each other.  The facade of self  descriptions dwells upon
images of community, using metaphors of face‑to‑face groups and invoking emotions.
78 Nationalism and its concept of "Nation" contributed also of course to our image of a
modem world. It contributed many ideological elements which today go without saying.
It may be worth to discuss them.
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79 Modern politics is in one important aspect a symbolic process, motivated and limited
through sociohistorical dynamics. That modem nationalism is so intimately linked with
war  is  not  an obvious  or  even natural  combination.  For  the  masses,  who had to  be
integrated as soldiers,  war was a costly and risky enterprise.  A reconstruction of the
prestige system was necessary in order to alter this attitude. The "Hero", and especially
the dead one, had to be constructed as peak element of the prestige pyramid (taking off
from the soldiers the ridiculous image of Plautus' "miles gloriosus") and even as an object
of secular quasi‑religious devotion. This ideologem was then artfully intertwined with
oscillating metaphors of "Freedom". Freedom was seen on the one hand as a controlled
realm conceived as "own" ‑ one's own farm or workshop or family ‑ and on the other
hand as accessible realm ‑  freedom of movement for migrants,  traders and access to
commodities.  The oscillation between the two aspects  comprised the strength of  the
concept.
80 The more politics were associated with communication, the more it was plausible to link
we‑groups to languages. Thus the idea that one nation should have one language and,
later, that one language makes a nation, is incrementally gaining acceptance. Though at
the  period  when  nationalism  was  formulated,  the  social  reality  was  still  that  of
multilingualism. .
81 In  the  beginning  nationalism  was  far  from  being  a  plausible  concept.  Now  the
combination of an "obvious reality" ‑  language ‑  with strong sentiments of prestige ‑
heroes interwoven with equally strong sentiments of fear and hope ‑ freedom ‑ , seems
almost  unchallenged  and  contributes  to  our  image  of  the  modem  world.  This
combination,  however,  was  arrived  at  a  two‑century  long  process  of  variation  and
selection. But this is not the end of we‑group ‑history ; competing concepts may yet be in
their evolutive process...
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NOTES
1.See Lonsdale 1993 and on the concept of imagined communities ‑ essential for this
papers argument ‑ Anderson 1983.
2.Financed by the Deutsche Forschungs‑Gemeinschaft.
3.We can apply some of this paper's arguments to the Alevi case. The remarkable
dynamism of a syncretistic group combining an overt and a hidden connotative identity
may be caught in a trap if confronted with the rigidity of a modem state's structure.
Double facades and integrative dynamism in the transformations of ritual and beliefs can
be seen from the outside as falseness and confusion. The accusation is ‑ in systemic terms  ‐
that of blurring boundaries and escaping clear categorization. The display of unequivocal
markers is imposed upon the community, flexibility has to be given up in favour of a
containment in restrictively conceived limits. This normalisation into an ethnic or
religious form, portrayed as modernization by the internal protagonists, may be seen in
systemic terms ‑ without any value judgement ‑ as a "trap".
4.Here I refer to a research project led by Thomas Zitelmann and myself ; financed by the
Deutsche Forschungs‑ Gemeinschaft.
5.Similarly some Black Sea Christians in Turkey switched to Islam in this century
dominated by "ethnic exchanges" but maintained the difference by declaring themselves
to be Alevites.
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6.It is in this respect, that Clifford Geenz wrote about primordial structures. In a chain of
misrepresenting quotations he is now made responsible for "primordialism" as a variant
of essentialism.
7.This necessary change in the structure of relevance assimilates switching we‑groups to
processes of individual conversion as described by Berger and Luckmann.
8.This solution of changing the symbols and keeping the content can even be found with
"new" theories in the humanities.
9.In Gennan "EIsaB‑Lothringer" or simplified "El sasser", though this means only the
southern, Allemanian part of the population.
10.The Suebian could call the Alsatian from the Vogese mountains "Du Wackes !" but not
the Alsatian the Suebian "Du Schwob !" (one year prison).
11.See Diericks 1989 for a discussion of Herder and its followers.
12.This was developed in the paper Elwert et al.1993. We owe the concept originally to
Victor Turner, who used it for the description of an element of initiation ritual. Ayse
Çaglar had yet earlier transfered it to a similar meaning as I did later.
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